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 Restitution in the Second
 Restatement of Contracts
 Joseph M. Perillo*
 The rules governing restitution in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
 combine outworn dogma with audacious innovation. The new Restatement's uni-
 fied coverage of the topic is an important improvement on its predecessor's treat-
 ment of the subject; the first Restatement's chapter on restitution dealt with res-
 titution primarily in three contexts: as a remedy for a defendant's breach; as
 relief in favor of a defaulting plaintiff; and as compensation for a performance
 rendered under a contract unenforceable because of noncompliance with the Stat-
 ute of Frauds.' In the Restatement (Second) the topic expands to encompass
 also restitution following avoidance of contract on grounds of fraud, duress,
 mistake, and the like, and following discharge because of impracticability, frus-
 tration of purpose, and similar circumstances.2 Surprisingly, restitution in cer-
 tain other contract-related contexts is not treated.3 The Restatement of Restitu-
 tion is cited for restitution as compensation for a performance under an agree-
 ment too indefinite to enforce the performing party's expectation interests, and
 for performances rendered in the course of unsuccessful negotiations.4 The Re-
 statement (Second) also fails to mention restitution in other contractual contexts,
 such as performance under an agreement invalid because an agent overstepped
 his authority5 and performance under an agreement that dissolves because the
 parties have different reasonable understandings of its meaning.6
 Despite its failure to cover the full range of restitutionary situations, the
 new Restatement improves upon its predecessor pragmatically and analytically,
 by covering a wider range of restitutionary circumstances in a unified manner. It
 * Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A. 1953, J.D. 1955, Cornell University.
 1. Restatement of Contracts, ch. 12, topic 3, introductory note (1932) [hereinafter cited as
 Restatement].
 2. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, ch. 16, topic 4, introductory note (1981) [hereinafter
 cited as Restatement (Second)].
 3. Certain additional restitutionary problems are covered or alluded to in both the first and
 second restatements in chapters other than the chapter on Remedies. For example, restitution for
 performances under agreements that are illegal or that violate public policy are dealt with in chapter
 18 of the first Restatement and chapter 8 of the second. Restitution following an agreement to
 rescind is the subject of ? 409 of the first Restatement and ? 283(2), and comment c thereto, of the
 second.
 4. Restatement (Second) ch. 16, topic 4, introductory note.
 5. See, e.g., Campbell v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 421 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1969).
 6. Estok v. Heguy, 43 W.W.R. (n.s.) 167 (B.C. 1963); Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247, 88
 N.E. 835 (1909); Shapiro v. Solomon, 42 N.J. Super. 377, 126 A.2d 654 (App. Div. 1956). For a
 recent case recognizing the intimate relationship between restitutionary recovery and the contract
 upon which it is based, see Hastoupis v. Gargas, Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 43, 398 N.E.2d 745,
 appeal denied, Mass. Adv. Sh. 519 (1980).
 37
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 succeeds pragmatically by providing the profession with a unified treatment of
 related material, and analytically by supporting the thesis urged several years ago
 that restitution in the context of failed agreements should be classified as a con-
 tractual remedy rather than as an appendage of a separate body of law known as
 Quasi-Contracts, or an even grander one known as Restitution.7 While the new
 Restatement neither accepts nor rejects this thesis, unified treatment of additional
 contract-related restitutionary situations may further expose its logic.
 I. RESTITUTIONARY RATIONALE: RESTITUTION and
 RELIANCE OR RESTITUTION versus RELIANCE?
 One of the advantages of reclassifying restitution in the context of failed
 agreements as a contractual remedy should be to clarify the rationale for restitu-
 tionary recovery. Since Keener's trail-blazing treatise on quasi-contracts8 was
 published in 1893, much academic orthodoxy has tied restitutionary remedies at
 law to the monistic concept of "unjust enrichment." Within a generation,
 however, the equation of unjust enrichment and quasi-contractual relief had
 come to appear inexact. Although granting that unjust enrichment was a signifi-
 cant underlying policy, Professor Woodward, in his text on quasi-contracts,
 found the term "enrichment" to be "unsatisfactory in that it connotes an actual
 increase of the defendant's estate." '? Woodward offered, instead, the concept
 of "receipt of a benefit." II The first Restatement of Contracts adopted Wood-
 ward's terminology and carefully avoided the unjust enrichment rationale.2 The
 Restatement (Second) ignores the conflict between the rationales of "unjust en-
 richment" and "receipt of benefit," frequently basing its rhetoric upon the
 former 13 while grounding its operative rules primarily on the latter. When a
 proper case for restitution is advanced, the Restatement (Second) usually allows
 recovery for benefits conferred whether or not the defendant has been enriched
 in estate. 4
 One of the comments to the Restatement (Second) casually employs the
 language of a third rationale in stating that "[t]he objective is to return the
 7. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1208 (1973). For a brief
 summary of and commentary on this thesis, see C. Knapp, Problems in Contract Law 948-49 (1976).
 8. W. Keener, A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts (1893).
 9. Professor Keener did not invent the concept of unjust enrichment. It derives from Roman law
 and was used from time to time by English and American courts and writers. His contribution was in
 turning much of what had passed as "contracts implied in law" into a coherent system based on
 unjust enrichment. For a brief history, see Perillo, supra note 7, at 1208-13.
 10. F. Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts 9 (1913).
 11. Id.
 12. One reference to the concept of "unjust enrichment" in the restitution chapter occurs in a
 discussion of restitution as an alternative remedy to tort. Restatement ? 347 comment a.
 13. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) ? 345 (c), (d); ? 344 comments a & d.
 14. See Restatement (Second) ? 370 comment a & illustration 3. For a puzzling deviation, see
 ? 373 illustration 11, which disallows restitution despite the fact that the services rendered are the
 services bargained for. The illustration appears to reintroduce the idea of enrichment into the concept
 of benefit. An enrichment rationale also appears in some of the comments and illustrations concern-
 ing the measure of recovery. See text accompanying notes 51-55 infra.
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 parties, as nearly as is practicable, to the situation in which they found them-
 selves before they made the contract."'5 Such language, which speaks of restor-
 ing the status quo ante, summarizes much sound case law and academic criticism
 of the older and more orthodox rationales.'6 When the rationales of conferral of
 benefit and restoration of the status quo ante conflict, the tension centers upon
 whether the plaintiff's reliance interest will be protected."7 When the plaintiff
 has expended funds, rendered services, or otherwise diminished his own estate in
 performing or preparing to perform an agreement that has since failed, but has
 not conferred a benefit on the defendant, the cutting edge of the case law has
 allowed recovery of these expenses.'8 Often courts have accomplished this by
 legal alchemy, transmuting reliance damages into "benefits conferred" simply
 by so labelling them.19 Other courts have, with greater candor, expressly pro-
 tected the reliance interest in restitution actions.20
 Because the drafters were aware of, and sympathetic to, the scholarship and
 cases that supported greater protection for the reliance interest,21 one would have
 expected the Restatement (Second) to recognize these authorities, if not to en-
 dorse allowing reliance damages in restitution actions. Rather than do either,
 however, the drafters took two radical steps: one was dramatically conservative,
 the other startlingly innovative. First, with some exceptions noted below, they
 15. Restatement (Second) ? 384 comment a. This is an example of the common confusion of
 status quo ante language with Woodward reasoning. See, e.g., M. Hill, H. Rossen & W. Sogg,
 Smith's Review-Legal Gem Series-Contracts 179 (3d ed. 1976).
 16. Perillo, supra note 7, at 1221-23.
 17. Restoring the status quo is an ambiguous concept. If the plaintiff has relied to his detriment,
 but has not conveyed any benefit to the defendant, it is impossible to return both parties to the
 position they occupied before either had acted. Thus, there are three conceivable responses: leaving
 the parties just as they are, returning the plaintiff to his former status by forcing the defendant to pay
 reliance damages, or a compromise between these two extremes. Only when either the second or
 third alternative is chosen does restoring the status quo accurately describe protection of a reliance
 interest.
 18. Such recovery is not appropriate in all cases, but is frequently granted where the defendant
 is more responsible for the contractual failure than the plaintiff is. See, e.g., Kearns v. Andree, 107
 Conn. 181, 139 A. 695, 59 A.L.R. 599, noted in 26 Mich. L. Rev. 942 (1928); Albre Marble &
 Tile Co. v. John Bowen Co., 338 Mass. 394, 155 N.E.2d 437 (1959), aff'd on rehearing, 343 Mass.
 777, 179 N.E.2d 321 (1962).
 19. Both in 1920 and in 1924, Williston noted that the reliance interest frequently received
 covert protection in restitution cases. 1 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts ? 536 (1920); 3 S.
 Williston, The Law of Contracts ? 1977 (1924). While Patterson described this tendency in 1936 as
 "Pickwickian," Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L. Rev. 223,
 230 (1936), Fuller and Perdue were constructing a more extensive comment on it. Fuller & Perdue,
 The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 2), 46 Yale L.J. 373, 394 (1937). In 1936 and 1938,
 Williston and Thompson reiterated and added to Williston's earlier observations. 2 S. Williston, A
 Treatise on the Law of Contracts ? 536 (rev. ed. Williston & Thompson 1936); 6 S. Williston, A
 Treatise on The Law of Contracts ? 1977 (rev. ed. Williston & Thompson 1938). Dawson wrote in
 the same vein in 1959. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 175, 191 (1959). This
 list is by no means exhaustive.
 20. See, e.g., Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Ala. 1960); Albre Mar-
 ble & Tile Co. v. John Bowen Co., 338 Mass. 394, 155 N.E. 2d 437 (1959), aff'd on rehearing,
 343 Mass. 777, 179 N.E. 2d 321 (1962).
 21. This espousal of the reliance interest is primarily manifested in the new Restatement's pro-
 visions with respect to promissory estoppel. See Restatement (Second) ?? 87(2), 88(c), 89(c), 90,
 139, 150.
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 framed restitutionary provisions reminiscent of the first two decades of the twen-
 tieth century. Rebuffing the authorities that protect the reliance interest in actions
 for restitution, the drafters declared that the restitutionary measure of recovery
 "exclude[s expenditures] to the extent that they conferred no benefit." 22 Thus,
 the reliance interest is barely protected because only rarely is a benefit conferred
 by reliance rather than by performance.23 Second, with a few quick strokes, the
 drafters edited earlier, tentatively adopted, provisions and apparently created a
 new cause of action. Neither an action for breach, the customary use of reliance,
 nor an action for restitution based upon a failed contract, this newborn writ is an
 action for reliance. Sections 15824 and 27225 of the Restatement (Second) were
 amended in 1979 to provide that where an obligation has been discharged or a
 contract avoided for impracticability, frustration, mistake, or the like, the court
 may grant, instead of or in addition to restitution, "relief on such terms as
 justice requires including protection of the parties' reliance interests." 26
 Reliance has traditionally been linked to the doctrine of promissory estop-
 pel, which renders binding a promise that induces foreseeable action or forebear-
 ance to the promisee's detriment, notwithstanding the absence of consideration
 or of other requirements for an enforceable promise.27 In each of the instances
 in which the Restatement (Second) engages promissory estoppel,28 the promisee's
 reliance interest is protected by enforcement of an otherwise defective contract
 against a party in breach. On the other hand, when a contract is discharged or
 avoided for impracticability, frustration, or mistake, there is no enforceable contract;
 no party is in breach. Heretofore, absent tortious conduct, the only common law
 action that was permitted in such circumstances was the quasi-contractual action
 of restitution-an action for reliance was unavailable. However, under the new
 formulation of sections 158 and 272, when a contract fails for impracticability,
 frustration, or mistake, an action for reliance is permitted. Although there is
 clearly some relationship between this action and the concept of promissory
 estoppel, the degree of kinship is unclear.29 If a new kind of action based solely
 on reliance is to be created, it should be given an analytic and procedural
 framework.
 22. Restatement (Second) ? 371 comment b. Another comment explicitly treats the reliance
 interest, stating that "[a] party cannot, however, recover his reliance interest under the rule stated in
 this Section ...." Restatement (Second) ? 377 comment b. See also id. ? 373 illustration 11; ? 375
 comment b. But see ? 376 illustration 4, where the reliance interest is protected apparently because it
 enriched the defendant's estate.
 23. For an example of that rare situation, consider the Second Restatement's illustration involv-
 ing a promise by a mortgagee not to foreclose for a year, even if the mortgagor makes no payments.
 In reliance thereon, the mortgagor makes valuable improvements. In breach of his promise, the
 mortgagee forecloses and buys the land at foreclosure sale. The mortgagor is permitted to recover the
 value of the improvements. Restatement (Second) ? 373 illustration 4.
 24. Restatement (Second) ? 158.
 25. Id. ? 272 (mistake).
 26. Id. ?? 158(2), 272(2).
 27. On the tremendous increase in application of the doctrine in recent decades, see Henderson,
 Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 Yale L.J. 343, 386 (1969).
 28. See Restatement (Second) ?? 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 139.
 29. I have previously noted the interconnection between restitution and estoppel. Perillo, supra
 note 7, at 1218.
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 The new Restatement's treatment of the reliance interest in restitution ac-
 tions bears the earmarks of a last-minute compromise insufficiently deliberated,
 the implications of which are obscure. Because there is no clash of social values
 between protecting the reliance interest in an action for restitution and protecting
 it in a different kind of action, the drafters' choice can only be judged in terms
 of what Fuller and Perdue called the "superstructure of the law." 30 Does the
 architectural choice made by the Restatement (Second) aid in the intelligibility of
 the law? In a field already overloaded with confusing and overlapping
 terminology,31 the creation of a new kind of action may provide further confu-
 sion. Will the choice ease the administration of justice? It is doubtful that this
 question, which ought to be basic to the design of our legal superstructure, can
 be answered affirmatively. As the common law has developed, the parties' res-
 titution and reliance interests were being protected in an action known, in recent
 decades, as restitution. No reason is apparent why this growth should be ob-
 structed and redirected into a conceptually new category.
 Although the new Restatement permits an action for reliance instead of, or
 in addition to, restitution in such contexts as mistake and impracticability, no
 parallel provision is supplied for the case of a breaching defendant. This is sur-
 prising, since this latter case contains the most compelling claim for the plaintiff.
 Nonetheless, the plaintiff can recover his expenses under the new Restatement in
 an action for damages rather than restitution. Section 349 permits any injured
 party to elect to recover reliance damages instead of expectancy damages.32 In-
 sofar as reliance expenditures confer a benefit on the defendant, recovery of
 reliance damages will protect the restitution interest; therefore, the election per-
 mitted by section 349 significantly diminishes the need for section 373, which
 covers restitution for a breaching defendant.33 Although the reliance interest will
 not be protected if the complainant labels his action restitutionary, the restitution
 interest can be promoted in an action for reliance damages. Consequently, the
 informed complainant will normally claim reliance damages.'
 30. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 Yale L.J. 52, 54
 (1936).
 31. In the field of restitution there is a profusion of terms that are nearly, but not quite, synony-
 mous. "Restitution" has become a term of art relatively recently, with the publication of the Restate-
 ment of Restitution in 1937. It encompasses rights at law known as quasi-contractual rights and
 certain equitable rights, particularly constructive trusts, that perform similar functions. "Unjust en-
 richment" is occasionally used, especially in England, as a synonym for restitution; one sometimes
 hears of the "law of unjust enrichment." Its primary use, however, is to describe an ultimate fact:
 "because X was unjustly enriched, he must make restitution." A "contract implied in law" is a
 fictitious contract. The fiction was created to fit certain actions into the writ of assumpsit. A contract
 implied in fact is a true contract that arises from the tacit agreement of the parties. Because students,
 practitioners, and even Blackstone were confused by the distinction between the two kinds of implied
 contracts, Keener and Woodward sought to extirpate the term "contract implied in law" from legal
 usage and to substitute for it the term "quasi-contract," which was borrowed from Roman law and
 only rarely used in the common law before 1893. Although the new term "quasi-contract" took
 hold, the old term successfully resisted extirpation to the further confusion of law students and
 lawyers.
 32. Restatement (Second) ? 349.
 33. Id. ? 373. The full range of the restitution interest is not, however, protected. Appreciation
 damages, such as are available under a constructive trust, see text accompanying notes 102-05 infra,
 are not available under ? 349.
 34. This is explicitly acknowledged in Restatement (Second) ? 373 comment d.
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 Two other distinctions between the two actions are noteworthy. First, in an
 action for reliance damages on a losing contract, the injured party's recovery is
 diminished by his prospective contract losses.35 No analogous reduction accom-
 panies a restitution action.36 Second, in an action for reliance damages on a
 losing contract, the contract price sets an upper limit on recovery,37 while in a
 restitution action, the injured party's recovery may sometimes exceed that
 price.38
 If, as some have argued, a restitution action for breach of contract is con-
 tractual, rather than quasi-contractual,39 it seems wrong-headed to permit the in-
 jured party to recover in restitution the same amount on a losing contract as on a
 profitable one. To permit the same recovery is to ignore the balance of risks
 negotiated by the parties and incorporated into the contract.'" Nonetheless, a
 majority of cases supports the new Restatement's exclusion of the loss factor
 from the calculation of restitution damages in an action for breach.4" Although I
 quarrel with particular details of the new Restatement's treatment of the restitu-
 tion and reliance interests where the defendant has breached, I believe that its
 provisions are generally pointed in the proper direction. The separate action of
 restitution for breach will eventually disappear as the restitution interest receives
 protection in actions for reliance damages. As Fuller and Perdue noted decades
 ago, the restitution interest is but a subspecies of the reliance interest,42 distin-
 guished simply by receipt of the benefit of restitution interest expenditures by the
 party against whom restitution is sought. This melding of restitution with re-
 liance in the context of default will free restitution for breach from domination
 by the concept of unjust enrichment, dominance developed in response to the felt
 needs of nonconsensual transactions.
 As I have sought to demonstrate elsewhere,43 there are several situations in
 which the law of restitution creates both the parties' primary rights and their
 secondary or remedial rights. For example, where one unofficiously pays the
 funeral expenses of a deceased neighbor who was only seemingly destitute, un-
 just enrichment of the decedent's estate provides the sole rationale for the plain-
 tiff's recovery. Such cases are relatively rare and fall outside the usual norms of
 commercial or interpersonal behavior; yet the concept and objectives of unjust
 enrichment, on which these uncommon cases are based, have been allowed to
 dominate the complex galaxy of restitution cases. Cases in which restitution is
 sought involve predominantly either tortious conduct or performance under a
 35. Restatement (Second) ? 349.
 36. Id. ? 373 comment d.
 37. Id. ? 349 comment a.
 38. See text accompanying notes 71-82 infra.
 39. 5 A. Corbin, Contracts ? 1106 (1964); F. Woodward, supra note 10, ? 260; Perillo, supra
 note 7, at 1212-19.
 40. This argument is pursued at greater length below. See text accompanying notes 71-82 infra.
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Algemon Blair, Inc., 479 F. 2d 638 (4th Cir. 1973); Connolly
 v. Sullivan, 173 Mass. 1, 53 N.E. 143 (1899). See generally 1 G. Palmer, The Law of Restitution
 ? 4.4 (1978).
 42. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 30, at 53-55.
 43. See generally Perillo, supra note 7.
This content downloaded from 150.108.60.10 on Tue, 20 Mar 2018 20:49:12 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1981] RESTITUTION 43
 failed agreement. In the latter instance, contractual policies should underlie the
 remedial rules readjusting the parties' economic relations. Among these policies
 are honoring the allocation of risks agreed to by the parties and recognizing
 customary understandings of suitable risk allocations, relative fault, and
 elementary fairness. Prevention of unjust enrichment is also a contractual policy,
 but it is not preeminent.
 II. MEASURE OF RECOVERY
 A. Enrichment or Market Standard
 A comment to the Restatement (Second) defines the promisee's restitution
 interest as "his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has con-
 ferred on the other party." I This prompts the question: how is that benefit to
 be measured? The first Restatement did not dwell on the measure of recovery,
 but its comments indicated that the market value of the performance would be
 appropriate where the performance rendered was part of the agreed exchange.45
 In other cases, the defendant would be liable only for the amount by which he is
 enriched.' Because these "other cases" are rare,47 market value generally pre-
 vailed. The new Restatement treats the question more flexibly and in greater
 detail. It adds section 371, "Measure of Restitution Interest,"48 which provides
 that "as justice requires" the measure of recovery is either the market value of
 the plaintiff's performance" or the "extent to which the other party's property
 has been increased in value or his other interests advanced." 50
 Restitution in contract arises in a variety of situations, from the extreme of
 a defaulting defendant to that of a defaulting plaintiff, and justice does not re-
 quire that the same measure of recovery always be used. The comments to sec-
 tion 371 appropriately urge flexibility in fitting the measure of recovery to the
 particular case, while comments to other sections attempt to guide a "just" fit.
 One suggests that doubts are to be resolved against a defaulting plaintiff."'
 Another qualifies the general rule that where a contract is discharged for imprac-
 ticability, the benefit is measured at market value;"2 it provides that where the
 benefit is destroyed by the event creating the impracticability, the "recovery
 may be limited to the measure of increase in wealth prior to the
 44. Restatement (Second) ? 370 comment a.
 45. Restatement ? 347 comment c. See also id. ? 348 comment a.
 46. Id. ? 347 comment c.
 47. The first Restatement, like its successor, limited restitution to situations where the defendant
 has received a benefit. Restatement ? 348 . Normally, the benefit is part of what has been bargained
 for. For an exceptional case where an unbargained-for benefit is recoverable, see Restatement ? 347
 illustration 7, which was the model for Restatement (Second) ? 373 illustration 4, discussed in note
 23 supra.
 48. Restatement (Second) ? 371.
 49. Id. ? 371(a).
 50. Id. ? 371(b).
 51. Id. ? 374 comment b.
 52. Id. ? 377 comment b.
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 [destruction]." S While resolving doubts against a defaulting plaintiff is sensi-
 ble, this qualification on the market value measure arguably is not. Assume that
 A contracts to shingle the roof of B's house for $5,000. After A has rendered
 services valued in the market at $2,000, increasing the building's value by
 $1,500, the house bums to the ground. According to the Restatement (Second),
 A may recover $1,500. 4 What is "just" in this case involving two innocent
 parties is not obvious, but the second Restatement's determination is apparently
 contrary to every case on point. At a minimum, these would allow A to recover
 the market value of his performance;55 some would even permit recovery for A's
 materials lost at the job site and other reliance losses."6 The comments do not
 attempt to explain why it is appropriate to limit A's recovery to $1,500.
 Although the new Restatement's call for flexibility is commendable, perhaps a
 conceptual framework explicating when an enrichment value should prevail over
 a market value measure would enable us to understand this result. Absent such a
 framework, it is not clear why the roofer should bear the loss caused by the
 homeowner's fire to the extent that the market value of his services exceeds the
 increase in the homeowner's estate, and this illustration leads one again to sus-
 pect that here, as elsewhere, the drafters were unduly influenced by Keener's
 unjust enrichment analysis.
 B. Contract Price as a Cap on the Measure of Recovery
 Debate in the restitution area has long smoldered over whether the contract
 price or rate sets an upper limit upon the measure of restitution. The case of
 Boomer v. Muir57 presents the conflict. Plaintiff, a construction contractor, jus-
 tifiably cancelled his contract because of defendant's breach. Had he completed
 performance he would have been entitled to a final payment of $20,000. Elect-
 ing to sue for restitution, plaintiff received a judgment for over $250,000, which
 was affirmed on appeal. Boomer accords with the "overwhelming weight of
 authority," which permits restitutionary recovery to exceed the contract rate or
 price.58 The 1979 tentative draft of the new Restatement audaciously but wisely
 followed the minority view, limiting restitution for part performance to the sum
 that would have been due had performance been completed.59 Restitution for
 breach is a contractual remedy;60 consequently, it seems inappropriate to ignore
 53. Id.
 54. Id. ? 377 illustration 4.
 55. According to Palmer, there "appears to be no case authority, nor should there be," limiting
 recovery to the enhanced value of the structure. 2 G. Palmer, supra note 41, ? 7.8, at 155 (emphasis
 in original). His footnote to this assertion specifically criticizes Restatement ? 357 illustration 1, upon which
 Restatement (Second) ? 377 illustration 4 is based. See reporter's note, Restatement (Second)
 ? 377 comment b.
 56. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 484 n.40 (2d ed. 1977). For extended
 discussion, see 2 G. Palmer, supra note 41, ? 7.8.
 57. 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933) (reversing an order granting a new trial).
 58. 1 G. Palmer, supra note 41, at 389.
 59. Restatement (Second) of Contracts ? 387(2) (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1979).
 60. See A. Corbin, supra note 39; 1 G. Palmer, supra note 41, at 366-67; F. Woodward, supra
 note 10, ? 260; Perillo, supra note 7, at 1215-19.
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 the parties' allocation of the risks.6' Should a plaintiff who would have lost on
 the contract receive an amount that not only spares him from further loss but
 also compensates him as if he had made a profitable bargain? Perhaps, on the
 erroneous assumption that the restitutionary action is divorced from the contract
 upon which the performance was based,62 that a contractual breach necessarily
 involves fault,63 or that the defendant is profiting from his own breach if he uses
 the contract to shield against greater liability.'M This last thought ignores the fact
 that the defendant's profit, if any, stems from the parties' bargain and not from
 any subsequent wrongdoing.
 The final draft of the new Restatement rejects the minority view,65 substitut-
 ing instead the conventional position, which ignores the contractual allocation of
 risks assumed by the parties and maintains that restitution for breach of contract
 is not a contractual action. This position seemingly conflicts with a premise of
 the new Restatement's rule on breaching plaintiffs. That rule provides that "in
 no case will the party in breach be allowed to recover more than a ratable
 portion of the total contract price." I While undoubtedly just and sound from
 the perspective of upholding the parties' allocation of the risks, this rule man-
 ifests recognition of the intimate connection between restitution and the contract
 upon which the restitutionary recovery is based.
 III. THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST: SOURCE OF
 BENEFIT AND APPRECIATED VALUE
 The constructive trust is an astonishingly powerful and flexible restitution-
 ary remedy. An aggrieved party can use it to obtain two important advantages:
 he can reach benefits acquired by the defendant from third persons, and he can
 procure any appreciation in value that benefits obtained by the defendant may
 have undergone. However, the Restatement (Second) not only fails to treat the
 constructive trust, but also advances provisions that are inconsistent, at least in
 part, with such uses.
 The Restatement (Second) states that restitution is available only if the ben-
 efit is conferred by the plaintiff. "It is not enough that it was simply derived
 from the breach." 67 The comments offer the illustration of an employee, A,
 61. See Childres & Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in Contract, 64
 Nw. U.L. Rev. 433 (1969).
 62. See Palmer, The Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach, 20 Ohio
 St. L.J. 264, 269-73 (1959).
 63. Id. at 278-79. According to Prof. Palmer, frequently no moral condemnation can properly
 be attached to a finding that a defendant has breached. 1 G. Palmer, supra note 41, at 395. This
 point is strongly emphasized by Childres & Garamella, supra note 61.
 64. J. Murray, Contracts 480 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
 65. Restatement (Second) ? 373(2); see id. comment d. For a transcript of the floor debate
 culminating in the change, see generally 56 ALI Proceedings 405-13 (1979).
 66. Restatement (Second) ? 374 comment b.
 67. Id. ? 370 comment a. The use of the word "breach" in the comment is inappropriate
 inasmuch as ? 370 ("Requirement That Benefit Be Conferred") purports to apply to restitution on all
 grounds, including misrepresentation, governed by the Restatement (Second).
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 who in violation of his obligation to his employer, B, not to work for anyone
 else, takes a part-time job with C. B cannot recover from A the salary paid by
 C, "because it [is] not a benefit conferred by B." 68 The Restatement (Second)
 of Agency, the source of this illustration, agrees with the result,69 but not with
 the rationale. Indeed, three of its sections are devoted to situations in which an
 employee is liable to his employer for benefits conferred by third persons.70 One
 of the most elementary of these situations involves a bribe paid to the employee.
 Without question, the employer can recover the value of the bribe in a quasi-
 contractual action at law,7' and may, as an alternative, have available the equi-
 table, restitutionary constructive trust.72 Consider also the fate of Frank Snepp, a
 former CIA agent, who had contracted with that agency not to reveal any intelli-
 gence or information about the CIA without its prior consent. In violation of this
 agreement, he wrote and had published a book detailing some of the actions of
 the CIA. A constructive trust was imposed upon the royalties he earned from the
 publication.73 Snepp's case is distinguishable from the Restatement (Second)
 illustration only on the ground that Snepp's relationship of trust and confidence
 with the CIA, which supplied a foundation for an equitable remedy, is absent
 from the Restatement (Second) example. These cases can be reconciled with the
 view of the Restatement (Second) that benefits received from third persons are
 not recoverable in a restitution action. This bar on recovery is expressed in a
 comment to a section, the black-letter text of which commences: "A party is
 entitled to restitution under the rules stated in this Restatement." 74 Conse-
 quently, the new Restatement does not foreclose recovery under the provision of
 the Restatement (Second) of Agency or the Restatement of Restitution, which
 treats the constructive trust in detail.75 Nonetheless, the Introductory Note to the
 Restitution Topic of the new Restatement appears to promise more: "This Topic
 treats restitution in five situations that are closely related to contracts. The first is
 that in which the other party is in breach and the party seeking restitution has
 chosen it as an alternative to the enforcement of the contract between them." 76
 Since the constructive trust is available for some contractual breaches and is
 68. Restatement (Second) ? 370 illustration 4.
 69. Restatement (Second) of Agency ?? 400 comment c, 404 illustration 2 (1958).
 70. Id. ?? 403, 404, 404A. See also Restatement of Restitution ?? 200, 199 comment b (1937).
 For a case where a fraud-feasor was made to disgorge a benefit that was not conferred by the
 plaintiff, see Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136, 55 A.L.R.2d 334 (1955).
 71. See Reading v. Attorney General, [1951] A.C. 507, discussed in Perillo, supra note 7, at
 1211-12. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Kelly, 1 Misc. 2d 624, 149 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct.
 1956); Restatement (Second) of Agency ? 403 (1958).
 72. Fuchs v. Bidwill, 31 111. App. 3d 567, 334 N.E.2d 117 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 65
 Ill. 2d 503, 359 N.E.2d 158 (1976); Restatement of Restitution ? 197 (1937).
 For a number of other cases, not imposing constructive trusts and not involving employment
 relationships, where a contracting party has been permitted recovery of the profit made by the
 defendant as a result of his breach, see 1 G. Palmer, supra note 41, ? 4.9.
 73. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
 74. Restatement (Second) ? 370 (emphasis added).
 75. Restatement of Restitution ?? 160-215 (1937) cover "Constructive Trusts and Analogous
 Equitable Remedies."
 76. Restatement (Second), ch. 16, topic 4, introductory note.
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 concededly restitutionary,7 some discussion of it belongs in the Restatement
 (Second).
 As indicated above, one of the advantages of the constructive trust is that a
 deserving party may use it to obtain the appreciated value of a benefit conferred
 on the other party. The Restatement (Second) discusses two situations in which
 the enrichment of the defendant's estate may exceed the market value of the
 benefit, suggesting for both that the plaintiff be restricted to the smaller
 recovery.78 Yet it fails to consider other fact patterns that would have implicated
 the constructive trust. For instance, in cases of restitution for misrepresentation,
 a topic covered by the Restatement (Second),79 where any increase in the value
 of fraudulently obtained property should clearly flow to the defrauded party,
 courts can use this remedy to award the plaintiff recovery in kind or the in-
 creased value of property no longer recoverable in kind.80 This measure of re-
 covery is indissolubly linked to the defendant's unjust enrichment, and leads to a
 larger recovery than either the status quo ante rationale or the receipt of benefit
 rationale measured at market value. Interestingly, there appears to be an increas-
 ing adoption of this measure of recovery in actions at law in which no construc-
 tive trust is imposed.8' Since the Restatement (Second) so enthusiastically
 embraces the unjust enrichment rationale, its failure to notice this use of the
 constructive trust as well as this development at law is surprising.
 IV. SPECIFIC RESTITUTION
 The right to specific restitution-the restoration of a specific thing to the
 party seeking the remedy-is enlarged dramatically by the Restatement
 (Second). The first Restatement made the availability of the remedy turn on the
 familiar twins: the uniqueness of the thing transferred and the inadequacy of the
 legal remedy.82 Instead, under the new Restatement, a party who otherwise
 qualifies for restitutionary relief is entitled to specific restitution 83 unless he is in
 default.84 The court in its discretion may withhold the remedy if granting it
 would "unduly interfere with the certainty of title to land or otherwise cause
 injustice." 85 Specific restitution based on a defendant's breach is also subject to
 the rule that restitution is unavailable for breach when the breaching party owes
 no duty other than to pay a definite sum of money.86
 77. It is one of the two principal topics of the Restatement of Restitution (1937).
 78. Restatement (Second) ? 371 comment b.
 79. Id. ? 376.
 80. See, e.g., Sher v. Sandler, 325 Mass. 348, 90 N.E.2d 536 (1950), noted in 63 Harv. L.
 Rev. 1463 (1950) & 45 Ill. L. Rev. 510 (1950).
 81. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
 82. Restatement ? 354.
 83. Restatement (Second) ? 372.
 84. Id. ? 372(1)(b). On the restitutionary rights of a defaulting party, see text accompanying
 notes 93-104 infra.
 85. Restatement (Second) ? 372(1)(a).
 86. Id. ? 373(2).
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 In its catalog of "Judicial Remedies Available," 87 the new Restatement de-
 scribes specific restitution as "requiring restoration of a specific thing to prevent
 unjust enrichment." 88 The link between this remedy-or group of
 remedies89-and prevention of unjust enrichment is tenuous; specific restitution
 serves objectives other than the redress of unjust enrichment. Both restatements
 use a familiar illustration in which specific restitution is available. A transfers a
 tract of land to B in exchange for B's promise to support A for life. B materially
 breaches the contract and A sues for specific restitution of the land. Specific
 restitution will be decreed.' The Restatement (Second) justifies this result by
 pointing to the difficulty of proving damages with sufficient certainty. Though it
 is doubtless true that expectancy damages are difficult to prove in this case, the
 alternative legal remedy of monetary restitution would not appear unduly diffi-
 cult to establish and would prevent unjust enrichment. Nonetheless, for several
 reasons, specific restitution is the most appropriate remedy, especially in the
 usual case where the parties contemplated that the grantor would continue to live
 on the premises. First, the facts present two traditional touchstones of equity
 jurisdiction: the uniqueness of real property9' and a relationship of trust and
 confidence. Second, because of the intangible values that often accompany own-
 ership of nonfungibles such as land, a money judgment will be inadequate com-
 pensation for the transferor's losses. Such a judgment is incapable of quantifying
 the value of these intangibles to the transferor; and if it could quantify them, it
 might not, to the extent that they do not enrich the transferee. Last, and usually
 decisive, a monetary award would violate the transferor's contractual intent. A
 did not offer the land for sale on the open market; limiting his recovery to
 monetary restitution would in effect force a bargain upon him that he never
 made.
 Recognizing that specific restitution functions to compensate for losses and
 to protect contractual intent helps justify subjecting the remedy to the general
 rule that restitution is unavailable where the claimant has fully performed and the
 party in breach owes no duty other than to pay a definite sum of money.92
 Assume that an owner of two patents sells one to corporation A for a sum certain
 to be paid in the future and assigns the other to corporation B in return for a
 promise of royalties and best efforts to promote the invention.93 If both A and B
 87. Id. ? 345.
 88. Id. ? 345(c).
 89. "Specific restitution" is actually a substantive result that may be obtained by using any
 number of procedural devices, such as an equitable decree cancelling a deed, a decree ordering the
 defendant to return a thing to the plaintiff, or a judgment at law authorizing a sheriff to replevy the
 object.
 90. Restatement ? 355 illustration 1; Restatement (Second) ? 372 illustration 3.
 91. For purposes of specific restitution, in contrast to specific performance, real property is not
 automatically treated as unique. Because the grantor was willing to part with the property, normally
 he cannot claim it has unique value to him. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 56, at 575.
 92. Restatement (Second) ? 373(2).
 93. Alder v. Drudis, 30 Cal. 2d 372, 182 P.2d 195 (1947); Restatement ? 354 illustration 7.
 See also Maytag Co. v. Alward, 253 Iowa 455, 112 N.W.2d 654, 96 A.L.R.2d 162 (1962) (restitu-
 tion of securities issued under a stock option plan).
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 breach, the seller is entitled to specific restitution from B, but not from A. By
 selling the first patent for a fixed price, the seller has quantified the value of the
 patent to him. Thus, his losses are certain; a judgment for the contract price will
 fully cover his losses and fulfill contractual intent. On the other hand, a court
 cannot as readily value the damage to the seller from B's breach. Although the
 restitutionary interest-the market value of the patent-could probably be ascer-
 tained with the aid of expert witnesses, the expectancy interest-royalties-is
 likely to be highly uncertain. It is this latter interest that the court will protect,94
 because the seller evinced no intent to sell at market value. Instead, he man-
 ifested his intent to participate in the earnings of the patent; it would be unfair to
 thrust a market-value bargain upon him. Thus, unjust enrichment plays no part
 in the determination that the seller may elect specific restitution. Rather, the
 determinant is that this remedy, and none other, will cancel an unjust loss suf-
 fered by the plaintiff and prevent distortion of his manifested intent.
 V. RESTITUTIONARY RIGHTS OF A DEFAULTING PARTY
 In 1937, a commentator described the status of a defaulting party who seeks
 restitution:
 For more than a century the plight of the defaulting plaintiff has
 been a prolific source of controversy among courts and legal scholars.
 Until 1834 the unpaid wilful defaulter was generally not entitled to
 judicial relief. This was the "common-law" rule. But in that year the
 Supreme Court of New Hampshire fired the first shot in a hundred
 year's legal war. Disregarding the hallowed precedents of the "com-
 mon-law rule" that court, in the case of Britton v. Turner, created the
 "modem rule," by granting succor (to the extent of $95) to a default-
 ing laborer. The reverberations of that shot threw the legal world into
 two camps, which have since then filled reams and reams of paper
 with attacks upon and defenses of the simple decision.95
 The debate still rages. In the absence of a statute on the subject, some jurisdic-
 tions grant the defaulting party no recovery,96 while others permit recovery on
 some contracts but not others. Professor Palmer's recent treatise states that no
 94. A thorough analysis of cases such as this may demonstrate that Fuller and Perdue's division
 of contract remedial choices into three interests cannot explain the full range of contract remedies.
 For example, although it is easy to state that specific restitution satisfies the restitution interest, it is
 quite clear that in our hypothetical, monetary restitution and specific restitution produce significantly
 different economic results and serve different goals. Similarly, it is possible to state that specific
 restitution protects the expectancy interest, but it does so in a considerably different way from that in
 which an award of expectancy damages protects it. In the case of the patent, it may be that the
 interest served is the inventor's autonomy and that this interest is protected separately from other
 interests.
 95. Mulder, The Defaulting Plaintiff in North Carolina, 15 N.C.L. Rev. 255, 255 (1937).
 96. New York falls in this category. See Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press &
 Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103, 106, 107 (2d Cir. 1953), prophesying a change in New York law. The
 prophecy has not been fulfilled. See Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1881), reaff'd in 32 Beech-
 wood Corp. v. Fisher, 19 N.Y.2d 1008, 228 N.E.2d 823, 281 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1967).
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 generalizations can safely be made.97 Proponents of recovery seek to protect a
 defaulting party's restitution interest and to prevent the other party from gaining
 a windfall. Britton, the laborer, after all, had worked for over nine months of a
 twelve-month term without compensation.98 His cause must have some appeal
 to everyone but an unreconstructed Ebenezer Scrooge. On the other hand, oppo-
 nents argue that recovery invites contract-breaking and rewards morally un-
 worthy conduct.
 The first Restatement compromised, generally permitting a defaulting party
 to recover in restitution where his breach was not "wilful or deliberate," I terms
 that are difficult to apply to many contractual breaches.'00 The Restatement
 (Second) extends the Britton v. Turner doctrine to its logical conclusion: the
 party in breach is entitled to restitution of "any benefit he has conferred . . . in
 excess of the loss that he has caused by his own breach" 101 whether or not his
 breach was wilful. Rules of contract law are not rules of punishment; the con-
 tract breacher is not an outlaw. His restitution interest deserves protection to the
 extent that it does not subvert the legitimate interests of the party aggrieved by
 the breach. The countervailing interests of the injured party are protected in four
 ways. First, the defaulting party's right to recovery is subject to the aggrieved
 party's right to offset his damages.'02 Second, the measure of benefit is limited
 to the actual enrichment and cannot exceed a ratable portion of the contract
 price.'03 Third, restitution is denied to the extent that the criteria for a valid
 liquidated damages clause are present.'04 Fourth, restitution is denied if the
 aggrieved party seeks and is entitled to specific performance.'05
 These choices appear sound. How does one restate the chaos of the case
 law? The answer can only be to choose the just path. What appears to be just to
 one generation may be viewed differently by another. Keener and Woodward
 thought it unsound to award relief to a defaulting party. "Considerations both of
 justice and of policy forbid its approval," wrote Woodward.",6 My own random
 poll reveals nearly unanimous disagreement with Woodward's idea of justice in
 this case. In contract law, unless there is a countervailing public interest, justice
 means protecting the reasonable expectations of contracting parties. If my poll is
 accurate, such parties today expect to be paid for their performance even if they
 breach, and they expect to pay fair value for the performance of others who
 breach against them. The drafters' choice wisely reflects these expectations.
 97. See 1 G. Palmer, supra note 41, at 568.
 98. Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 487 (1834).
 99. Restatement ? 357(l)(a).
 100. See A. Corbin, supra note 39, ? 1123.
 101. Restatement (Second) ? 374(1).
 102. Id. ? 374; id. comment a.
 103. Id. ? 374 comment b.
 104. Id. ? 374(2).
 105. Id. ? 374 comment a. Two additional rules can perhaps be added to this list. First, specific
 restitution is unavailable to the breaching party. See note 82 supra. Second, any doubts about the
 measurement of recovery should be resolved against him. See note 50 supra.
 106. F. Woodward, supra note 10, at 274. See also W. Keener, supra note 8, at 222.
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 CONCLUSION
 The discussion of restitution for parties in default is an apt place to con-
 clude, because it sounds a note of approval. While I have questioned some of
 the Second Restatement's provisions, I have no doubt that if its rules on restitu-
 tion are followed, justice will generally result. The main difficulty that I per-
 ceive in the new rules on restitution is their treatment of the reliance interest,
 which the drafters have ejected from the restitutionary path and placed on an
 uncharted course.
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